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Abstract
It is shown that Paul Romers suggestion to model algorithmically the
use and production of ideas in an endogenous growth model is formally
feasible. Such a modelling exercise imparts a natural evolutionary avour
to growth models. However, it is also shown that the policy implications
are formally indeterminate in a precise and e¤ective sense.
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1 Introduction
Paul Romer, in [10] and [11], going beyond even his seminal papers on endoge-
nous growth theory, broached new visions for an understanding of the growth
process in widely di¤ering economic systems. He points out that the conven-
tional modelling of growth processes are decient in their incorporation of the
role and genesis of ideas. To rectify this deciency he proposes an economic
denition of ideas based, inter alia, on a distinction between their use and their
production. These denitions have an evolutionary and algorithmic underpin-
ning to them; moreover, the institutional setting in which ideas are used and
produced are also given an evolutionary basis1 .
In this essay an attempt is made to encapsulate some of these imaginative
suggestions in an algorithmic  i.e., recursion theoretic or computable  for-
malism. Thus, in section §2, Romers suggestions are summarized with such
a formalism as the backdrop for the interpretations. Next, in §3, building on
the skeletal model developed by Romer, an algorithmic interpretation of his for-
malism is suggested which makes the empirical implementation of the modied,
computable, model immediate. In particular, the framework becomes natural
for a Genetic (or any other evolutionary) Programming implementation. This
gives the algorithmic formulation an evolutionary avour. A brief concluding
section, §4, suggests some of the directions in which the framework in this essay
can be expanded and completed.
The policy implications of Romer´s novel framework appears to be the feasi-
bility (and desirability) of local Pareto-improving searches for better-practice 
rather than the much maligned and over-used concept of best-practicetech-
nologies. I derive two formal propositions, in §3, that suggest the algorithmic
infeasibility of the formal, e¤ective, implementation of such searches. The re-
sults do not, of course, exclude the possibility of e¢ cient non-algorithmic imple-
mentation. However, what it means to implement anything non-algorithmically
remains a moot question.
2 Background and Motivation
The economic underpinning of Romers denition of an idea is that it is nonrival
and excludable2 . Nonrival means the use of an idea by one agent does not
deprive other agents from using it. Excludability signies the feasibility of an
1There is a vast and sophisticated economic literature harnessing metaphors from the the-
ories of evolution, neurophysiology and computability. This is evident at the exciting frontiers
of growth theory, evolutionary game theory, computable and computational economics and
behavioural economics. Much of this serves as the tacit background to this essay. I shall,
therefore, feel free to utilize some of the theoretical technologies and conceptual underpin-
nings emanating from the theories of evolution, neurophysiology and computability without,
in each instant, dening or explaining technical terms.
2To put this denition in perspective it can be contrasted with the characterization of a
standard public good, which is nonrival but also nonexcludable.
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agent preventing other agents from using it3 .
The functional characterization of an idea is based on the dichotomy between
its use and its production. Romer explains this dichotomy in a hypothetical
economic setting: ideas are used for producing human capital4 ; in turn, human
capital is used to produce ideas . This suggests useful denitions in an economic
setting in which ideas may enhance the descriptive and explanatory power of
(endogenous) growth models. For the formal denition of an idea Romer resorts
to the imaginative metaphor of toy chemistry sets5 . Such sets typically consist
of a collection of N jars, each containing a di¤erent chemical element. Thus,
in a set with N jars there can be at least 2K 1 combinations of K elements
(K = 1; 2; :::::; N). If we move from a childs chemistry set to a typical garment
factory in the of a developing country we might nd that sewing a shirt entails
52 distinct, sequenced, activities. There are, thus, 52! = 1068 distinct orderings
of the sequences in the preparation of a shirt. Now, as Romer perceptively
notes:
For any realistic garment assembly operation, almost all the
possible sequences for the steps would be wildly impractical, but
if even a very small fraction of sequences is useful, there will be
many such sequences. It is therefore extremely unlikely that any
actual sequence that humans have used for sewing a shirt is the best
possible one.
[10], p. 69.
Thus:
The potential for continued economic growth comes from the
vast search space that we can explore. The curse of dimensionality
[i.e.,2K 1 ; or52! = 1068 ] is, for economic purposes, a remarkable
blessing. To appreciate the potential for discovery, one need only
consider the possibility that an extremely small fraction of the large
number of possible mixtures may be valuable.
ibid, pp. 68-96 ; italics added.
There are some formal problems with these imaginative and interesting ob-
servations. Firstly, it is clear that Romer is conning his domain of analysis to
the integers, natural numbers or the rational numbers; therefore, formal analy-
sis will have to be combinatorial, constructive or recursion theoretic. Convexity
3This is where cryptology, in particular public-key cryptology, enters the scheme of things,
in particular via patents and patenting laws.
4Human capital is, on the other hand, an excludable, rival good.
5Economists of my vintage will recall Trevor Swans brilliant metaphor of meccano sets to
put up a scarecrow.....to keep o¤ the index-number birds and Joan Robinson herself([9], p.
343). Is it a sign of the times that our metaphors have evolvedfrom the mechanical to the
chemical? Where next, then?
6This, surely, is also a basis for the kind of learning by doingthat emerged from Lund-
bergs Horndal e¤ectas famously formalized by [1] (but cf. also [4], ch.3) and very much a
foundational ingredient of endogenous growth theory.
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will be one of the rst casualties of working in such a domain; but also compact-
ness. Secondly, there is the perennial question of the existence of a best possible
sequence. Thirdly, even if existence can be proved it is not clear that it can be
discovered and implemented in an operational sense unless existence is proved
combinatorially, constructively or recursion theoretically. Fourthly, there may
not be any formal way of discovering, formally, even the extremely small frac-
tionof sequences that may well be valuable. Finally, even in the unlikely event
that all of these issues can satisfactorily be resolved, there is the real question
of the transition from the currently implemented sequence to a more valuable
regionof the feasible domain. Unless the currently utilized sequence is in the
neighbourhood of the extremely small valuable fraction it is unlikely that a
transition makes economic sense in the context of a pure growth model with its
given institutional background. The point at which development will have to be
distinguished from pure growth may well be located in this transition manifold,
if such a thing can e¤ectively7 be dened, to be somewhat pseudo-mathematical
about it.
These problems need not be faced as squarely within the traditional produc-
tion theoretic framework with its handmaiden, the book of blueprints8 . In the
traditional framework, which is in the domain of real analysis, the well dened
concepts of the e¢ cient frontier and concomitant best-practice technologies and
so on make most, if not all, of the above issues almost irrelevant. But, by the
same token, make it impossible to raise the interesting and important issues
that Romer is trying to broach. Romer emphasizes time-sequenced processes9
and, hence, must have something more than the book of blueprints metaphor
for the repository or encapsulation of ideas. I believe that he is trying to open
some manageable vistas without trying to peep into all of the contents of Pan-
doras proverbial box. I believe also that it can be done, although not without
changing the mathematical and conceptual framework of analysis. Such is the
backdrop for my formal interpretation of the Romer suggestions and the basis
for the two propositions I derive in this paper.
To return to Romers ideas on ideas, the casual empiricism of the above
two quotes, underpinned by the metaphor of the childs toy chemistry set and
its functions suggests, to him, the analogy of ideas as mixtures; or, as each
of the potentially feasible 2K 1 mixtures (i.e., each of the 52! = 1068 ways of
sequencing the sewing of a shirt):
Within the metaphor of the chemistry set, it is obvious what
one means by an idea. Any mixture can be recorded as a bit string,
an ordered sequence of 0s and 1s [of length N] ........... [A]n idea
7 In the recursion theoretic sense.
8Obviously, the book must have an appendix instructing the user on the necessity and
mode of using the axiom of choice. Every indiscriminate reliance on indexing over a contin-
uum of agents, technologies etc., is an implicit appeal to the axiom of choice, or one of its
none¤ective and noconstructive equivalents (cf., [13]). Even more problematically, there is the
prior question of the e¤ ective construction of the book, in the rst place - even in principle.
9 I dont think Böhm-Bawerk or Hayek (of the Pure Theory of Capital) would nd them-
selves in unfamiliar territory in such a conceptual world for production.
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is the increment in information that comes from sorting some of
the bit strings into two broad categories: useful ones and useless
ones..............
When a useful mixture is discovered .............. the discovery
makes possible the creation of economic value. It lets us combine
raw materials of low intrinsic value into mixtures that are far more
valuable. Once we have the idea, the process of mixing will re-
quire its own [Production Function] (specialized capital and labour).
For example, the bit string representing nylon requires a chemical
processing plant and skilled workers. Important as these tangible
inputs are, it is still the idea itself that permits the resulting in-
crease in value. In this fundamental sense, ideas make growth and
development possible.
ibid, p. 68; italics added.
An immediate formal question is whether sorting a set of ordered sequence
is e¤ectively feasible. If sorting is an e¤ectively feasible process, then so will
the process of discovery be, at least in the above context. Leaving the answer
to such a question to the next part, let me move to Romers next metaphor,
which is to get hints on the way to encapsulate, formally, the role played by
ideas, dened as evolving bit-strings, when used to produce human capital.
Here Romer relies on neurophysiological metaphors: ideas, literally, recongure
the architecture of the neural network representation of what Simon would term
the Thinking (Wo)Man (cf., [12], ch.2 and [15])10 . Ideas.....represented as pure
pieces of information, as bit strings(p. 71) enhance the productivity of physical
capital solely by a rearrangement of the possible permutations of the constituent
elements that go into its manufacture: be it a process, such as sewing a shirt,
or a piece of equipment, say a computer. Similarly, they enhance the value of
human capital by reconguring the physical architecture underlying, say, thought
processes:
Now consider human capital. In my brain there are di¤er-
ent physical connections between my neurons. ....[T]he knowledge
that reading a software manual [for a new computer and new word-
processing software gives] rearranges connections in my brain and
makes my human capital more valuable. .... The increased value
is created by new ideas. Whether it takes the form of a hardware
design, software code, or an instruction manual, an idea is used to
mix or arrange roughly the same physical ingredients in ways that
are more valuable. And in each case, these ideas can be represented
as pure pieces of information, as bit strings.
ibid, p. 71; italics added.
10 I dont think there is the slighted hint or suggestion that Romer subscribes to any version
of the serial, centralized, strong (or even weak) AI vision when he makes these analogies and
invokes such neurophysiological metaphors.
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However, Romer does not himself give such a (formal) representation of ideas
as bit strings in a production function setting that is compatible with the domain
suggested explicitly (natural or rational numbers) in these two path-breaking
papers. However, heuristically, ideas, represented as bit strings encapsulating
pure pieces of information, function as inputs into a physical architecture rep-
resenting human capital and transform its wiring, so to speak, in such a way
that itis able to process them more e¤ectively, in some formal and measurable
sense11 . From standard results in automata and computability theory, going
back to the classic works by McCulloch and Pitts, Kleene and others, it is well
known that neural network architectures can be given recursion theoretic for-
malisms as automata of varying degrees of complexity. To be consistent with the
standard postulates of rationality in economic theory it is, however, necessary
to postulate an architecture that is formally equivalent to a Turing Machine12 .
Such an architecture allows rational decision processes to exhibit a kind of for-
mal untamability of ideas. Let me expand on the heuristics of this last comment
a little more (to supplement the previous discursive comments).
The inadequacy of the traditional book of blueprints vision of feasible tech-
nologies becomes patently evident if any such interpretation is attempted for
ideas held by rational economic agents interpreted as Turing Machines. The
background to this statement is provided by, for example, the Busy Beaver Tur-
ing Machines13 . Even if the neurons in a brain are nite, not even the propo-
nents of strong AI would suggest that the world of ideas in any unit can formally
be tamed or accessed - unless by magic or the kind of sleight of hand involved
in invoking the axiom of choice. Somehow, somewhere, the open-endedness of
ideas must assert itself in some kind of indeterminacy14 in models of growth
and development. That is why the past can never hold all the secrets to the
future. Trivial though this remark may sound, to formally encapsulate it in
an interesting and operational way is not easy. And without such a formalism
it will not be possible to delimit the range of validity of Romers fertile ideas.
Hence the recursion theoretic formalism of this essay - although this is only one
of the reasons.
This completes the background and the intuitive building-blocks15 .
11The ideal way to proceed, at this point, would be to interpret and dene information also
recursion theoretically, for which there is a well developed tool-kit provided by algorithmic
information theory (cf. [12], ch. V).
12This is fully formalized and discussed in [12], ch. III.
13The Busy Beaver Turing Machines, their architecture, perplexities and relevance for eco-
nomics are fully discussed in [14], ch.3.
14Formally, this means undecidabilities or uncomputabilities, neither of which can be en-
capsulated in the non-algorithmic mathematics of real analysis routinely utilised by the math-
ematical formalisms in standard production theory.
15 In fact, and perhaps more importantly, the world of discovery is surely a subset of the
world of inventions in the domain of ideas. Hence, this writer conjectures that constructive
mathematics, built on intuitionistic foundations, is a better framework in this particular area
of economics. I view the recursion theoretic messages of this paper as a halfway house between
such an ideal and the current orthodoxy of Bourbakian formalism in standard mathematical
economic theory.
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3 A Recursion Theoretic Formalism
We can, now, piece together a recursion theoretic formalism. As a preliminary
to doing this it is necessary to summarize Romers production sub-model which
is to be embedded in an (endogenous) growth framework. Romer considers
output, Y , to be an additive function of a standard production function and a
term representing the production of ideas, one for each of, say, n manufacturing
sectors16 as follows17 :
Y = F (K;L) +
nX
j=1
Gj(Kj ; Lj ;Hj ; ;Aj) (1)
Where, in addition to the standard notation, we have:
Hj : Human capital used in sector (or activity) j;
Aj : idea, characterizing sector (or activity) j;
Next, Romer suggests, with characteristic originality, that new ideas be for-
malized as a general dynamical system as follows18 :
A(t+ 1) = S[HA(t);
 
A1(t); A2(t); ::::; An(t)

; (H1(t);H2(t); :::::; Hn(t))] (2)
This has the following interpretation. The genesis of new ideas is a function
of:
HA(t) : Human capital used exclusively in searching for the production of
new ideas;
Ai(t) : The collection of ideas available in a pre-specied economic region at
time t (8i = 1; 2; :::::; N ;N  n)
Finally, the role of ideas in enhancing human capital in a conventional
learning-by-doingspecication is to be captured in the following way to com-
plete the production sub-model:
H(t+ 1) = 
[H(t); A(t)] (3)
Two observations regarding the above terse formalism by Romer may well be
worth quoting explicitly, simply to add some clarity and economic motivation.
Firstly, referring to the above equation (i.e., (3)), Romer suggests that ([10], p.
86):
"[L]earning how to use a computer software by using it [can
be captured by writing] human capital acquisition as a function of
16The notation G came about from Romers original example for Garmentmanufacturing;
eventually it was retained as the generic notation for manufacturing.
17All the functions are endowed with the traditional mathematical assumptions in produc-
tion theory.
18Romer formalizes in continuous time; I have, for ease of exposition chosen to use a discrete-
time formalism. None of the results in this paper depends on choosing one or the other
formalism, even if the transformations are nonlinear. The notation S denotes the activity of
searching for new ideas.
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the use of specialized human capital on the job in a conventional
learning-by-doing specication."
Secondly, the economic underpinnings for the whole of the production sub-
model is described succinctly and convincingly along the following lines (ibid,
p.86):
"[The above] description of the accumulation of new ideas and
new human capital relies on two di¤erent kinds of joint product
assumptions. Someone with human capital of type j who is employed
in activity j produces manufactured good j, produces more human
capital of type j, and (occasionally) makes new discoveries of the
better ways to sew a shirtvariety."
Now, according to the intuitive denitions suggested by Romer (see above,
§2):
1. Ai(t); (8i = 1; 2; ::::; N) are specied as bit strings;
2. Hj(t); (8j = 1; 2; ::::::::; n), when considered as arguments of Gj ; (j =
1; 2; ::::::; n); are neural networks
(1) is not a serious formal problem; (2), however, requires a formal speci-
cation of a neural networkthat is capable of computation universality - i.e.,
the computing power of Turing Machines. If not, it will not be compatible with
the standard, minimal, rationality postulates of economic theory (cf., again,
[12], ch.III). Then, by the Church-Turing Thesis, we can represent each Hj ,
j = 1; 2; ::::; n, and HA as programs (i.e., as algorithms), computationally equiv-
alent to the corresponding Turing Machine. Then, by stacking the bit strings,
Ai, 8i = 1; 2; :::::N , we can consider the prevailing collection of ideas (at time t)
as a program19 (or algorithm), too. This means the arguments of the function S
in (2) are a collection of programs and, thus, search can be said to be conducted
in the space of programs.
At this point a direct genetic programming interpretation of the (computable)
search function S makes the dynamical system (2) naturally evolutionary. How-
ever, the bitstring representing ideas can be retained as the data structures for
the programs, partial recursive functions and Turing Machines in (1)~(3). Then,
search will be conducted in the space of programs and data structures.
A similar interpretation for (3) is quite straightforward. However, (1) is an
entirely di¤erent matter. Standard denitions dene the arguments of F andKj
and Lj as arguments in Gj on the domain of real numbers. Given the algorithmic
denitions of Hj and Aj , it is clear that Gj must be a partial recursive function
for the whole system (1) (3) to make algorithmic sense. This means one of
two possible resolutions:
19 Recall that [A]n idea is the increment in information that comes from sorting .... . In
this connection see the illuminative discussion in [6], ch. 4, §1, on Skills as Programsand
Bronowskis Silliman Lectures([2], ch. 3).
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 Either Kj and Lj , (8j = 1; 2; :::::; n), must be dened as computable real
numbers; hence, extensive re-denitions of the domain and range of de-
nitions of Hj and Aj from the computable numbers to the computable
reals.
 Or, Kj and Lj dened over the (countable set of) computable numbers.
Either way standard constrained optimization must be replaced either by
classical combinatorial optimization or recursion theoretic decision problems,
on the one hand; and, on the other hand, one loses the applicability of sepa-
rating hyperplane theorems20 and, hence, welfare and e¢ ciency properties of
equilibria cannot, in general, be derived by algorithmic methods. These con-
siderations, particularly taking of the second of the above alternative routes,
makes it possible to state, as a summary, the following two theorems21 .
Proposition 1 Given the recursion theoretic interpretation of (2), there is no
e¤ective procedure (i.e., no algorithm) to locate or identify an arbitrary
Pareto improving conguration of ideas from the given conguration of initial
conditions.
Proof. The proof of this proposition is based on a simple application of the
Rice (or Rice-Shapiro) theorems in classical recursion theory. The dynamical
system that is (2), given the recursion theoretic underpinnings to it, can be
represented by an appropriate (Universal) Turing Machine or, equivalently,
by an appropriate Universal Program. The given initial conditions for the
dynamical system (2), corresponds to the initial congurations for a Turing
Machine computation or its program equivalent. These initial conditions and
congurations correspond, economically, to the status quo set of ideas. But by
Rices theorem no nontrivial subset of programs can be e¤ectively located by
starting from any arbitrary conguration for a Turing Machine.
In other words, there is no a priori local, e¤ective, search procedure no
algorithmic search procedure that can be used to discover a Pareto-improving
set of ideas. Hence, one must resort to satiscing searches i.e., rely on heuristics
(in the senses made clear and famous by Simon).
Proposition 2 Given an initial, empirically determined, conguration of ideas,
represented algorithmically in (2), there is no e¤ective procedure to determine
whether S, implemented as a program will Halt (whether at a Pareto-improved
conguration or not).
Proof. The proof of this proposition is an immediate consequence of the Un-
solvability of the Halting Problem for Turing Machines. The necessary
contradiction is obtained by supposing that there is an e¤ective procedure to
20More generally, the Hahn-Banach theorem.
21 I shall use two standard results from classical recursion theory in the proofs of the two
propositions, below. An excellent source for an exposition of these results is [3].
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determine that an empirically given conguration of ideas, used as initial condi-
tions to implement a program for a Turing Machine, will result in a well-dened
set of output values.
In other words, this proposition suggests that it is impossible to nd, by
algorithmic means, denite answers to questions about the existence of feasible
production processes to implement any given set of ideas; only trial and error
methods  again, heuristics  can be resorted to, in this computable world,
replete with undecidabilities. The latter point can be made more explicit by
proving this proposition, alternatively, by exploiting the diophantine properties
of recursively enumerable sets and, then, applying the results used in showing
the unsolvability of Hilberts 10th Problem.
Remark 3 The two propositions, together, cast doubts on the blessings of the
curse of dimensionality to which Romer referred (see above, §2 and [10], pp. 68-
9). There are no e¤ective procedures  i.e., algorithms - discoverable a priori
and systematically to determine which small fraction of the large number of
possible mixtures may be valuable. This is why economic development as a
planned process, like the evolutionary paradigm itself, is so di¢ cult, bordering
on the impossible, to encapsulate in formal growth models, whether endogenous
or not.
I suppose the moral of the algorithmic formulation and the implication of the
two propositions are that evolutionary models of growth à la Nelson and Winter
have been, together with Molières M. Jourdain, speaking prose all along; and
Romer is absolutely right, on the basis of his intuitive denitions, to conclude:
 .....a trained person is still the central input in the process of trial and
error, experimentation, guessing, hypothesis formation, and articulation
that ultimately generates a valuable new idea that can be communicated
to and used by others.([10], p.71; italics added).
 The same arrogance that made people at the turn of the century think
that almost everything had already been invented sometimes leads us to
think that there is nothing left to discover about the institutions that can
encourage economic development. ......... Just as in a childs chemistry
set, there is far more scope for discovering new institutional arrangements
than we can possibly understand.([10], pp. 66, 89; italics added).
The question, however, is how to embed Romers enhanced growth model
within an institutional framework that is conducive to development. I suggest
that Romers trained person adds The Tacit Dimension ([8] especially, ch.1,
pp.1-27; but cf. also [7], especially Part Two), among other things, to his
enhanced growth model. Or, as Polanyi may have felicitously summarized, in
an imaginary conversation with Romer:
"We can know more than we can tell."
[8], p.4; italics in the original.
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To that extent the model has to be formally open ended; i.e., with some
indeterminacy. However, the indeterminacy is not arbitrary. The above two
propositions are an attempt to encapsulate formal indeterminacy in a structured
way. Some kind of formal border between what can be known, learned and told
- i.e., formally so described - and that which cannot be so described denes the
dividing line between the neat and determined world of formal growth models
and the messy and evolutionary development process. The skeletal recursion
theoretic formalism and interpretation of Romers ideas given above, and the
ensuing two propositions, makes it possible to indicate the formal nature of
this dividing line. In general, processes that are recursively enumerable but not
recursive allow the kind of indeterminacy I am suggesting. The proofs of the
above two propositions would locate the indeterminate range without actually
determining them - to put it somewhat paradoxically.
4 Concluding Notes
It is interesting to note that Paul David ([5]), in a not-unrelated contribution,
tackles the broader issue of the role, nature and scope of knowledge in technolog-
ical change and, hence, in the growth processes of economies. He, too, proposes
an interesting dichotomy for the denition of knowledge: codied and tacit (the
latter along lines suggested by Michael Polanyi, op cit22). These denitions are
also based on an economic setting with an institutional structure that seems to
have an algorithmic and evolutionary perspective. Paradoxically, and contrary
to received wisdom, it is possible, I believe, to use the notion of oracle (or rel-
ative) computation23 to recursion theoretically formalize tacit knowledge. On
the other hand, codied knowledge is straightforward algorithmic knowledge
and almost identical, formally, to Romers concept of idea.
Let me try to explain, in an elementary and heuristic way, the meaning of
the above remarks. There is no better way to summarize Polanyis pioneer-
ing attempts to delineate tacit from non-tacit knowledge than his concise but
richly evocative statement that we can know more than we can tell. I have
suggested that this statement encapsulates the role of Romers trained person,
to whom one must turn to implement production sequences that have some-
how been transplanted from one institutional and historical setting to another.
There are several interesting examples of such attempts in Romers essay and
I refer the interested reader to peruse it for further enlightenment and explica-
tion. The essential point and role of Romers trained personand Davids tacit
knowledgeis that their expertise cannot be formalized and transplanted; but
they are necessary for the operational part of production sequences to function
e¢ ciently.
Assume, now, that the codiedpart has been transplanted in the form of
production processes, formalized, as suggested above, recursion theoretically.
22See also [6], ch.4, §2.
23See [3], ch.10.
11
An operative, even as part of the formalized production process, may occasion-
ally have to seek the trained personsadvice and help on e¤ecting a particular
decision at some point in the sequence. How can this role be formalizedin the
recursion theoretic formalism I have employed above? I believe there is a simple
answer although the simplicity belies its combinatorially complex content. The
simple answer is to embed the model in its standard recursion theoretic formal-
ism within a framework capable of appealing to an oraclefor advice and help,
as and when the need arises when nonrecursive problems are encountered.
In other words, as codied knowledgeis implemented in the form of trans-
planted production processes formalized recursion theoretically, the relevant op-
erative will seek the help of the trained personwhenever knowledge and skills
that are known but cannot be toldwill be required. This category of knowledge
can - and must - include patented knowledge as well. This is almost exactly
analogous to a computation process which, from time to time, halts and re-
quests additional, non-recursive information before it can proceed. Thus, the
rational economic agent as a Turing Machine operating or implementing codi-
ed knowledgeof ideas formalized as bit-stringswill, on encountering the need
for knowledge that could not or may not be so represented, will appeal to the
oraclefor help before proceeding with the computation, decision process and so
on. The only non-formal requirement we will have to append here is that which
is classically attributed to an oracle24 . Under this interpretation the standard
model of oracle or relative computation is more than adequate for the purposes
I have in mind. But a full elaboration of these points, in a formally satisfactory
way, would require a disproportionate amount of space and, therefore, I reserve
it for a di¤erent exercise.
An important question for immediate consideration within the framework of
the algorithmic formalisms for the Romer (and even the David) model(s) may be
that of ensuring excludability . Using recursion theoretic cryptographic results,
in particular public-key cryptographic methods, it is not di¢ cult to ensure rel-
atively secure excludability. This will circumvent some of the sensitive issues of
reverse engineering ([5]), patent violation and so on that bedevil current trading
regimes between the developing and the industrially developed economies. But
such questions are beyond the scope of the limited exercise attempted in this
paper.
24 To go back to the origins:
For the word which I will speak is not mine. I will refer you to a witness
who is worthy of credit; that witness shall be the God of Delphi - ..... he is a
god, and cannot lie; that would be against his nature.
Apology: The dialogues of Plato (Jowetts translation., 3rd ed., Vol. II, p.113;
italics added)
12
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